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ABSTRACT

This thesis presents a qualitative theoretical analysis
of the variables leading to the 13 September 1993 signing
of the Declaration of Principles between Israel and the
Palestine Liberation Organization.

The global and regional

implications of the end of the Cold War and the demise of
the Soviet Union, the Second Gulf War, and developments in
the occupied territories culminating in the Intifada are
examined.

The end of the Cold War meant the end of

superpower patronage and unlimited military support for
radical regimes such as Syria and non—state actors such as
the PLO.

The Second Gulf War further eroded the position

of the PLO, while propelling Syria into a leadership role
in the ensuing peace negotiations begun at the Madrid
Conference.

A weakened PLO led to the dominance of Hamas

in the occupied territories.

The result of these forces

was the 1993 peace agreement between Israel and the PLO.
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C HA P T E R
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INTRODUCTION

The signing of the Declaration of Principles on 13
September 1993 between Israel and the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) at the White House was heralded by many
as the end of the Arab—Israeli conflict in general, and of
the Israeli—Palestinian conflict in particular.

As events

since that time have shown, such an enthusiastic conclusion
may have been overly optimistic.

Still, it was a watershed

event that created much hope for an improvement over the
status quo of the last twenty—six years.
Perhaps much of the optimism sprang from the mutual
recognition of the actors and the involvement of radical
regimes long perceived to be hostile toward Israel, who
were seen as waiting for the day to come when Israel would
finally be defeated.

This long-standing Arab perception

regarding Israel was illustrated by Hasayn Haikal, editor
of the Cairo daily Al—Ahram, in an editorial following the
1967 Six Day War.
There is one Arab nation which lives on a territory
stretching from the Arab Gulf to the Atlantic Ocean and
numbers 100 million souls.
The unity of this nation is not
a subject for debate.... At the heart of this nation a
1
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foreign unit has been formed, in the shape of a sharpangled
triangle.... This triangle separates the Eastern Arab
territory and peoples from the Western Arab territory and
peoples.
In this way, Israel's geographic location forms an
artificial island in the midst of the Arab ocean.
This
situation cannot persist no matter what extraordinary
resources are supplied.
The waves on both sides will
continue to beat against this artificial island and in the
course of time will wear it down until it breaks and falls
apart and is swept away in the mighty expanse of the o c e a n .1

What was it that changed this perception for a few key
actors and led to the creation of an environment conducive
to mutual recognition and the signing of a peace agreement?
The analysis of a conflict should begin by "...examining the
goals of the adversaries...the focal points of their
positions, which in turn create their collision."2

The

focal point of the conflict between Israel and the Arabs in
general, and Israel and the PLO and Palestinians in
particular, is a clash for control over the same piece of
land, "...known to the former as Israel and to the latter as
Palestine."3
Zionists lay claim to this piece of land based on the
belief that Jews have the right to a national home there
because of the presence of a Jewish nation there two
thousand years ago.

Further justification is given by

^•Quoted in Michael Brecher, "The Middle East Subordinate System
and Its Impact on Israel's Foreign Policy," International Studies
Quarterly 13, no. 2 (June 1969):
138.
2Yehoshafat Harkabi, Israel's Fateful H o u r , trans. Lenn Schramm
(New York:
Harper & Row Publishers, 1988), 1.
3James A. Bill and Robert Springborg, Politics in the Middle
E a s t . 3rd ed. (Glenview, IL:
Scott, Foresman/Little, Brown Higher
Education, 1990), 300.

referring to world-^vide anti-Semitism, the suffering of the
Holocaust, and the development and modernization of a
democratic state in the region.

Many Zionists also claim

that since the Palestinians are Arabs, they should simply
move to one of the Arab states, Jordan being the one most
commonly referred to.

Palestinians deny the claim on the

land by Zionists, arguing that they have owned and occupied
it for centuries.

In addition, Palestinians have refused

to recognize a state created by colonial powers, and resent
being made to pay for the sins of the rest of the world.4
The change in perceptions and creation of an
environment conducive to peaceful coexistence occurred in a
larger context than that of the local conflict over land.
In this thesis, I shall describe and explain developments
in the peace process by examining the role of the Intifada5
and the PLO in the global, regional, and domestic contexts
of the move toward peace.

Since 1987, the Intifada has

placed increased pressure and demands on Israel for some
sort of resolution to the conflict between it and the PLO.
While the Intifada as an event, and the PLO as a major
actor in the whole process, are important in examining the
move toward peace, this analysis cannot concentrate solely
on the Intifada and the PLO, however, since the interaction
between them and each with other actors and influences must
4ibid.
5The Intifada is the Palestinian uprising in the occupied
territories.
The word "Intifada" is the English equivalent of the
Arabic Intifadah.

be taken into account.

What were the other determinants

and influences that compelled Israel and the PLO to pursue
peace?

Answering this question requires a theoretical

analysis of three key variables: the global and regional
implications of the end of the Cold War and demise of the
Soviet Union, the Second Gulf War between Iraq and the
United States— led Multinational Coalition, and developments
in the occupied territories culminating in the Intifada.
The purpose of the analysis will be to test the proposition
that were it not for the conjunction of these three
variables, the signing of the Declaration of Principles
between Israel and the PLO would not have occurred.

CHA P T E R

A

FRAMEWORK
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OF ANALYSIS

It is commonly accepted in political science today that
no single grand or universal theory exists that is capable
of explaining great changes in the world.6 The peace
agreement between Israel and the PLO certainly qualifies as
a major change.

Without a single theory to establish the

parameters of inquiry in describing and explaining the
developments that led to the peace accord, it is necessary
to employ several theories at different levels of analysis.
This approach allows examination of the whole— the global,
regional, and domestic contexts and actors involved— rather
than an examination of a single actor operating at only one
level of analysis.

Conceptualization

What were the determinants and influences that
compelled Israel and the PLO to pursue peace?

Identifying

the determinants and influences produce concepts to be used
as variables.

These variables in turn become indicators

6Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, International Relations
Theory (New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., 1993), vii.

5

6

subject to qualitative analysis.

Identification of the

levels of analysis and actors involved produces the
concepts to be operationalized.

They may be individuals,

subnational groups, states, transnational groups,
international groups or organizations with states as
members, or the international system as a whole.7
A state, Israel, and a transnational group, the PLO,
acted together to produce peace.

Israel and the PLO then

become the dependent variable who were influenced toward
this end.

Other "actors"— sometimes taking the form of

historical events— operating at various levels combine as
independent variables.

They include the global and

regional implications of the end of the Cold War and the
demise of the Soviet Union, the Second Gulf War, and
developments in the occupied territories culminating in the
Intifada.

The 1948 War of Independence, the 1967 and 1973

wars, and the 1982 invasion of Lebanon may all be
considered as antecedent variables.

World pressure on

Israel for some sort of resolution of the conflict, a need
to break up the united Arab negotiating front they faced at
the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991, and the bargaining
power of the parties are all alternative variables.
These variables are not strictly independent since they
do not act autonomously from one another.

They combine in

7James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending
Theories of International Relations (New York:
HarperCollins
Publishers, 1990), 22— 25.

a conjuncture to influence Israel and the PLO.

Arranged in

hierarchical fashion at different levels the variables can
be employed theoretically to construct a framework for
analysis.

By operationalizing the variables in this manner

they serve as indicators to be used in a qualitative
theoretical analysis.

This comparative analysis will test

the proposition that were it not for the conjuncture of
these variables, the signing of the Declaration of
Principles would never have occurred.

Me thodology

It is necessary to identify the approach in the
presentation of the information and arguments used to test
this proposition.

Any approach proceeds from the point of

view of the person conducting the research.

This point of

view determines how the research is conducted and this is
"...determined by the evaluative ideas that dominate the
investigator and his age."8
The evaluative ideas that have dominated the discipline
of political science can be divided into three phases.
first was the traditional approach.

The

It was historical,

non-comparative, normative, conservative, and focused on
the legal documents and institutions of government.9

8Max Weber quoted in Viotti and Kauppi,
T h e o r y . 2.

International Relations

9See, for example, Alfred Zimmern, The League of Nations and the
Rule of Law. 1918— 1935 (New York:
MacMillan & Co., 1936).

8

Behavioralism was the second.

It was ahistorical,

empiricist, abstract, and focused on the scientific method
used in the natural sciences in an effort to be
explanatory.10 This focus led to the study of topics that
could be quantitatively measured and led to a primacy of
method over substance.

Both the traditional and behavioral

approaches were criticized for being too conservative and
ethnocentric.

The third or current phase is the post-

behavioral approach.

This approach is both empirical and

normative and is primarily oriented toward an
interpretation of the Third World.

It seeks to be less

abstract, conservative, and ethnocentric with a focus on
substance rather than method.

It is radical, holistic, and

change—oriented.11
The differences between the behavioral and postbehavioral approaches are the result of two distinct views
of the world and how knowledge is perceived.

When applied,

these two views, positivism and historicism, result in
either a behavioral orthodox approach or a post—behavioral
radical approach, shaping the methodology used in
conducting research.12
10See, for example, Samuel A. Kirkpatrick, Quantitative Analysis
of Political Data (Columbus, OH:
Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co.,
1974).
1:LSee, for example, Immanuel Wallerstein, Geopolitics and
Geoculture:
Essays on the Changing World— System (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1991).
12Ronald H. Chilcote, Theories of Comparative Politics
Westviaw Press, 1981), 63.

(Boulder:

9

Positivist thought can be traced to the French
Enlightenment and British empiricism.

This approach

stresses the use of natural science methods and technology
in acquiring knowledge.

Knowledge is based on objectivity

and the observation of real experience.

This sensory

experience is independent of time, place, and circumstance.
The mind perceives knowledge the same way regardless of
time or place.

Facts that lead to knowledge can be known

and verified through the empirical observation of reality
and are valid only if observed and tested.13 This is the
foundation of behavioralism and the use of quantitative
methods for testing theory.

It is ahistorical, abstract,

and relies on breaking down the whole into component parts
that can be isolated and subjected to empirical testing.14
In contrast, historicist thought focuses on the whole
of history and believes that all knowledge is essentially
relative to time and place.

It is traced back to

Giambattista Vico and Johann Herder and is closely
associated with the nineteenth century German theories of
Georg Hegel and Karl Marx.

This approach argues that

knowledge based on sensory experience obtained through
empirical observation is not objective.
and bias play a part.

Prior awareness

There are a variety of views of the

world, and the perception of knowledge changes through time

13I b i d . , 62.
14I b i d . , 74.
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and across cultures.15 This approach is historical,
substantive, interdisciplinary, holistic, and relies
principally on qualitative methods.

Since knowledge cannot

be separated from the observer, the relations of component
parts must be examined in the context of the whole.16
My approach is radical post-behavioral in the sense
that it is holistic, historical, interdisciplinary, and
utili2 es different theories at different levels to inform
and shape a descriptive comparative analysis.17 This
approach is flexible and allows an examination of several
variables together, rather than studying each in isolation,
using qualitative empirical methodology.
This

methodology is substantive content analysis.

Content analysis, the "...systematic counting, assessing, and
interpreting of the form and substance of communication,"18
produces information for use in a descriptive analysis.
Describing the parts or relations of things is "...intended
to provide an accurate representation of some
phenomenon...,"19 in this case the conjuncture of several
variables that led to the signing of the Declaration of
Principles between Israel and the PLO.
15ibid., 62-70.
16Ibid., 74.
17Ibid., 402.
18Jarol B. Manheim and Richard C. Rich, Empirical Political
Analysis:
Research Methods in Political Science, 3d ed. (New York:
Longman Publishing Group, 1991), 160.
19I b i d . , 73.
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The unit of measure in content analysis can be a word,
a theme, or an item.

An item is the communication itself

taken as a whole, such as a journal article or book.20
This is the unit of measurement I will use.

Substantive

content analysis is concerned with the substance of the
item.

Focusing on what is said gleans salient references

and ideas used to support and inform the analysis.21 Using
this method for descriptive analysis enables me to
"...summarize fairly rigorously certain direct physical
evidences of the behaviors of, and the relationships
between, various types of political actors."22

Theoretical

Approaches

Various types of political actors operating at
different levels of analysis necessitate the use of several
theories in order to examine the whole context since no
single theory is capable of doing so.

These different

theories "...provide sets of reasons why facts should be
connected in given ways and make facts useful by providing
us with a framework for interpreting them and seeing their
relationship to one another."23

20ibid., 162-3.
21Ibid., 164.
22 I b i d . , 161.
23I b i d . , 19.
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Conflict Theory
The term "conflict" generally refers to a condition
where one group of people, united by tribal, ethnic,
linguistic, cultural, religious, socioeconomic, or
political traits, are opposed to or engaged in
confrontation with another group.

This occurs as a result

of the opposing groups "...pursuing what are or appear to be
incompatible goals,"24 such as trying to control or occupy
the same piece of land.
Conflict, as opposition or confrontation between
groups, involves human interaction.

It does not, in this

sense, refer to the struggle of people against their
environment or to mere competition between them.

This

interaction as conflict may be manifest or underlying.
Manifest conflict refers to conflict over something
tangible such as land or some other resource.

Underlying

conflict is the psychological component of the interaction.
It may involve personal dislike, hate, prejudice, or
distrust at the individual level, and competing ideology or
nationalism at the group level.

Manifest conflict is

almost always accompanied by some form of underlying
conflict and "...often cannot be resolved more than
temporarily unless the underlying conflict is dealt
with."25
24Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Contending Th e o r i e s . 187.
25Bertram H. Raven and Arie W. Kruglanski, "Conflict and Power,"
in The Structure of Conflict, ed. Paul Swingle (New York:
Academic
Press, Inc., 1970), 71.

13

Manifest conflict may occur in the form of
international war, civil war, revolution, guerrilla
insurgency, political assassination, sabotage, terrorism,
seizure of hostages, strikes, popular revolt, and economic
sanctions and reprisals.

Underlying conflict can be

manipulated through psychological warfare, propaganda,
speeches, media reports, and pamphlets to assist or oppose
some form of manifest conflict.26
In these various forms, conflict may be violent or
nonviolent, controllable or uncontrollable, and

subject to

resolution depending on these and other circumstances.

It

may not be continuous or uniformly intense, fluctuating as
circumstances and the environment change, but it is a
recurring phenomenon common to all societies.

The

resolution of all conflict is often referred to as a
necessity for human progress, but many social scientists
hold the view that the "...total elimination of conflict from
the human situation is not only impossible but undesirable,
because conflict in some forms is a condition of social
change and progress."27 Whether conflict is good or bad
depends on the context in which it arises, the resources
and values at stake, and the cost versus the gain and
outcomes for the groups involved.

26Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff,
27Ibid., 188.

Contending T h eories. 192.
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There are usually multiple causes of conflict in its
various forms and different theories have been constructed
in an attempt to explain them.
fall into one of two categories:
macrocosmic.

These theories generally
microcosmic and

Microcosmic theories of conflict assume that

the origins of conflict are within the person and are a
basic part of human nature.

The behavior of the individual

leads or contributes to the behavior of the group.
Macrocosmic theories assume that the origins of conflict
are found in human institutions.

They study conflict at

the group level of classes, movements, collectives,
coalitions, or other social institutions.

The difference

between the two might be described as an analysis of
conflict based on knowledge of the individual versus
knowledge of collective behavior.28
A microcosmic analysis of conflict proceeds from the
presumption that the origin is related to human nature.
The key concept in this approach is aggression on the part
of the individual.

Is this aggression a result of genetic

predisposition or is it a psychological response to
society?

According to Sigmund Freud, aggression is a

psychological response to society resulting from
frustration.29 Freud's concept of frustration—aggression
was based on his notion that the basic function of an

28I b i d ., 189.
29I b i d . , 276.
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individual was the seeking of pleasure and avoidance of
pain.

Whenever one or both of these functions were

blocked, the result was aggression.

This aggression was

most often directed at the external world.30
John Dollard, expanding on Freud's work in a more
deterministic way, assumed that aggression is always a
consequence of frustration.

"The proposition is that the

occurrence of aggressive behavior always presupposes the
existence of frustration and, contrariwise, that the
existence of frustration always leads to some form of
aggression."31 Dollard believed that all forms of
conflict— class struggle, revolt, revolution, civil war,
etc.— manifest themselves in frustration—aggression
tendencies.32
These tendencies resulting in aggression can be taught
to children and passed from generation to generation.

This

socialization of aggression allows it to perpetuate and
continue, but only if social permission is given.

This

permission, a form of socialization in itself, may take two
forms.

Rivalry, which is direct and a form of manifest

conflict, is the first.
patterning.

The second is traditional

This form of underlying conflict gives social

permission by identifying patterns that justify or give a
30John Dollard et al., eds., Frustration and Aggression
Haven:
Yale University Press, 1939), 21.
31Ibid., 1.
32I b i d . , 23.

(New
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historical reason for aggression.33 The result of this
pattern identification is a determination of who will be
perceived as the source of the frustration and, therefore,
the target of aggression.

It is communicated through and

reinforced by culture, ideology, and nationalism.34
Recently social scientists in general and psychologists
in particular have been more inclined to agree with Freud
and Dollard that the source of aggression is some form of
frustration.

This approach has been reinforced by conflict

studies of the Third World that focus on the causes of
revolution.

Many believe that "...the high conflict

potential of the developing areas is a function of
frustration caused by economic deprivation."35
Macrocosmic theories approach conflict at the group
level and often view revolts or revolutions as social
movements. James Denfronzo defines a social movement as a
"...persistent and organized effort on the part of a
relatively large number of people either to bring about or
resist social change."36 A social movement may be
classified as either a reform or a revolutionary movement.
A reform movement seeks to change only limited aspects of a
society without drastically changing or replacing the

33ibid., 152.
34Ibid.,

158.

35Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories, 282.
36James Denfronzo, Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements
(Boulder:
Westview Press, 1991), 7.
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existing social, political, and economic institutions of
the society.

An example might be a movement the goal of

which is to change an existing policy of a government.
Revolutionary movements seek to extensively change or even
totally replace existing institutions.
as a means of implementing this change.

Most use violence
This violence may

take one of the forms of manifest conflict such as
guerrilla insurgency, terrorism, or popular revolt.37
Revolutionary movements may be further classified into
two ideal types.

A "left-wing" revolution's main goal is

the redistribution of resources. It seeks to change or
replace major institutions in order to alter the social,
political, and economic relations within a society.

A

"right-wing" revolution's central aim is to restore or
reestablish traditional institutions that have been lost.
This ideal type emphasizes maintaining social order and
traditional authority over the pursuit of social equality
through institutional change.38
Denfronzo identifies five critical factors that are
necessary and sufficient conditions for a successful
revolutionary movement if they occur simultaneously.
are:

They

mass frustration resulting in a popular uprising,

dissident elite political movements, unifying motivations,
state political crisis, and a permissive world context.39
37I b i d ., 8.
38Ibid., 9.
39I b i d ., 10-11.
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Mass frustration resulting in popular uprisings occurs
when a large portion of the population becomes
discontented.

Denfronzo believes this popular discontent

is a consequence of "relative deprivation."

Relative

deprivation is the result of the gap between expectations
and the ability to realize those expectations in the
present society under current conditions.

This may be the

result of rapidly deteriorating economic conditions or
standards of living, a period of economic growth followed
by decline, military defeat resulting in occupation and
exploitation, a perception that the current situation is
morally wrong, or increased knowledge (and therefore
expectations) through communication, experience, and
education.

Relative deprivation leads to popular

discontent, popular discontent to mass frustration, mass
frustration to mass mobilization, and mass mobilization to
mass participation in the uprising.40
Dissident elite political movements usually emerge from
a combination of state crisis and relative deprivation
causing mass frustration.

They are important because it is

often elites who play a key role in forming or expanding
and communicating an ideology to be used as an additional
unifying motivator in support of the revolution.

The

ideology may be of any type (socialist, nationalist,

40ibid., 11.
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religious, etc.) so long as it is successful in helping to
mobilize mass support and participation.41
Successful mobilization of mass support and
participation in a revolutionary movement requires a strong
unifying motivation.
of nationalism.

This motivation often takes the form

Nationalism emerges as a reaction to

occupation, exploitation, and rule by a foreign power whose
actions are perceived not to be in the national interest of
the occupied.

Regardless of individual or small group

differences, "...people sharing the same language, culture,
and historical experience who perceive that their ethnic or
national group has been the victim of exploitation by
another group or country can join together in an effort to
end their domination."42
Most successful revolutions occur in conjunction with a
state political crisis.

This crisis may be a result of a

defeat in war, natural disaster, economic depression,
withdrawal of support from a key ally, or changes in the
global or regional political, economic, and military
conditions.

The consequence of the crisis is that the

state is incapable of coopting the revolutionary movement
or of successfully ending it through the application of
force.

A state in crisis, not capable of putting down a

41Ibid., 14.
42I b i d . , 16.
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revolution but not threatened by it either, often turns to
a negotiated settlement to end the conflict.43
The last factor Denfronzo identifies as necessary for a
successful revolution is the existence of a permissive or
tolerant world context.

This means that foreign actors do

not intervene in an attempt to prevent or put down a
revolutionary movement.

It may be that outside actors

interfere or provide assistance of some sort in support of
the revolution.

During the Cold War many revolutions were

greatly influenced and their outcomes determined by the
presence or absence of a superpower.44
The five factors identified by Denfronzo as necessary
for a successful revolution represent a more modern,
detailed, and systematic version of the frustration—
aggression proposition of Dollard.

Farrokh Moshiri and

Jack A. Goldstone formulate a theory of modern revolution
that incorporates the same factors as Denfronzo's theory,
bur also identify several other important characteristics.
The barriers that prevent the realization of rising
expectations must be perceived by the collective mass as
being illegitimate.45 All societies have barriers to
expectations, but most are recognized as being penetrable
43Ibid., 18.
44Ibid., 19.
45Farrokh Moshiri, "Revolutionary Conflict Theory in an
Evolutionary Perspective," in Revolutions of the Late Twentieth
Ce ntury, e d s . Jack A. Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr, and Farrokh Moshiri
(Boulder:
Westview Press, 1991), 14.
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if certain conditions are met, such as getting an education
or working hard for promotion.

Illegitimate barriers

cannot be overcome since they are constructed or maintained
for the sole purpose of preventing advancement.

The

perception of illegitimacy is strengthened further when the
state responds with force to the ensuing mass uprisings.
Force usually fails and in fact becomes a unifying
motivator and fuels more mass frustration and uprising.
Another important component of discontent leading to
mass frustration and popular uprising is population growth.
A surge in population growth producing a large proportion
of youth who are discontented due mainly to economic
factors (falling wages, rising prices, unemployment,
underemployment) make willing participants in a popular
uprising.

This is especially true when they are

concentrated in small urban areas and are easily
mobilized.46 In order for mass mobilization and
participation to be successful there must exist at the
local community level groups, institutions, and leaders
willing to organize and motivate participation despite the
presence of oppressive state authority.47 Mass
mobilization for uprising and revolution may be dependent
upon relative deprivation, discontent, and frustration, but

46ibid., 30.
47Jack A. Goldstone, "An Analytical Framework," in Revolutions
o f the Late Twentieth Century, eds. Jack A. Goldstone, Ted Robert
Gurr, and Farrokh Moshiri (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1991), 40.

22

popular support for the cause is most easily catalyzed by
seizing on an opportunity such as a spontaneous
demonstration or a riot.

Communicated through pamphlet

literature and speeches the catalytic event is used to
motivate and mobilize the population.48
The microcosmic conflict theory of frustration—
aggression and the macrocosmic theory of revolution are
useful in examining the Palestinian struggle against
Israel.

From its establishment until 1982 the PLO was

engaged in a revolutionary movement using manifest conflict
against Israel.

Beginning in 1987 the locus of the

Palestinian struggle moved to the occupied territories.
All five of Denfronzo's necessary factors were relevant in
this move and it resulted in a popular revolutionary
uprising, the Intifada.

Realist and Bargaining Theory
Realist and bargaining theory also proceed from certain
presumptions about human nature.

Realism holds the view

that problems in the world are the "...result of forces
inherent in human nature."49 Human nature is power hungry,
untrusting, unmalleable, and prone to conflict rather than
cooperation.

Improvements in the world are obtained by

48I b i d ., 43.
49Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson, Politics Among
Nations;
The Struggle for Power and P e a c e , 6th ed. (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1985), 3.
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accepting these forces and working with them.

Since

conflict is inevitable, a reliance on moral principles is
insufficient.

Conflict must be managed by pursuing self-

interests through the manipulation of power.
Self-interests are pursued and conflict managed via
relationships among various actors through international
politics.

International politics becomes "...the effort of

one state, or other international actor, to influence in
some way another state, or other international actor."50
The actors involved in international politics are viewed by
realism as being rational in the sense that given
particular goals they always "...consider feasible
alternatives to achieve these goals in the light of their
existing capabilities."51 The primary goal, or selfinterest, is national security and the preservation of the
state.

Military and political issues dominate the agenda

of international politics in an attempt to maximize this
national self-interest.

Referring to Niccolo Machiavelli's

The Prince, Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi put it this
way:
"...The security of the state is so important that it may
justify certain acts by the prince that would be forbidden
to other individuals not burdened by the princely
responsibility of assuring that security.
The end— security
of the state— is understood to justify any means necessary
to achieve that end."52

50Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Contending T heories, 14.
51Viotti and Kauppi,
52I b i d . , 39.

International Relations T h e o r y , 35.

Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson viewed the
pursuit of national self-interest as being the pursuit of
power.

All of international politics is a struggle for

power.

How power is defined and used depends on the

political and cultural environment of the actor, but it
"...may comprise anything that establishes and maintains the
control of man over man."53 In this view power dictates
the content and nature of all social relationships, but it
is especially important for the relations between actors in
international politics.

In international politics, the

primary objective in peace or war is "...neither war nor
peace but something common to both:

the enhancement of the

power of your state to resist the will of others and impose
your will upon them, and the diminution of the power of
others to resist your will and impose their will upon
you."54 During times of peace the primary means of
achieving this is through "...bargaining supported by threats
of force."55
Bargaining is usually conducted through diplomatic
channels and conferences.

According to Morgenthau,

diplomacy has four basic tasks:
1) Diplomacy must determine its objectives in the light of
the power actually and potentially available for the pursuit

53Morgenthau and Thompson, Politics Among Nat i o n s , 11.
54Adel Safty, "The Arab— Israeli Balance of Power After the
Storm," International Relations XII, no. 3 (December 1994):
53.
55 Ibid.
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of these objectives.
2) Diplomacy must assess the objectives of other
the power actually and potentially available for
of these objectives.
3) Diplomacy must determine to what extent these
objectives are compatible with each other.
4) Diplomacy must employ the means suited to the
its objectives.56

nations and
the pursuit
different
pursuit of

In determining and assessing objectives, their
compatibility, and the means suited to their pursuit and
the power required to obtain them, diplomacy becomes
bargaining in itself.

"It seeks outcomes that, though not

ideal for either party, are better for both than some of
the alternatives."57 These outcomes reflect a common
interest to avoid a bad alternative that usually takes the
form of mutual damage and physical harm resulting from an
application of force.

An application of force, however,

can also be an exercise to demonstrate bargaining power.
The potential to damage property and inflict physical harm
by violent acts is used by an actor to influence behavior,
to affect the decisions and choices made by another actor.
In this way the power to hurt is bargaining power and its
use is coercive diplomacy.58
In coercive diplomacy, "whether it is sheer terroristic
violence to induce an irrational response, or cool
premeditated violence to persuade somebody that you mean it
56Morgenthau and Thompson, Politics Among N a t i o n s , 563.
57Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven:
University Press, 1966), 1.
58I b i d . , 2.

Yale
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and may do it again, it is not the pain and damage itself
but its influence on somebody's behavior that matters."59
Its use entails a strategy to alter the nature of power
relations in a conflict situation, and therefore influence
the bargaining process and potential outcomes.60
This strategy, the "exploitation of potential force" to
gain advantage or concessions in a conflict situation
relies on the realist assumption that rational actors will
consciously calculate the cost versus the gains of various
outcomes.61 This approach also assumes that:
...Most conflict situations are essentially bargaining
situations. They are situations in which the ability of one
participant to gain his ends is dependent to an important
degree on the choices or decisions that the other
participant will make.
The bargaining may be explicit, as
when one offers a concession; or it may be by tacit
maneuver, as when one occupies or evacuates strategic
territory.62

Explicit bargaining takes place at a conference table.
Tacit bargaining can be ongoing and take place anywhere.
Actors may watch and interpret each other's behavior with
the awareness that actions are being interpreted on both
sides.

Actions are undertaken based on the expectations of

what the other will do in reaction, and the subsequent

59lbid., 3.
60Raven and Kruglanski,

"Conflict and Power," 69.

61Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1960), 5.
62Ibid.
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reaction is interpreted and leads to further action
again.63
The distributional aspect of bargaining is where one
actor gets more out of the deal than the other.

This is

explicit bargaining and each actor is "...guided mainly by
his expectations of what the other will accept."64 As the
bargaining proceeds and expectations get more complex, an
agreement is reached when an actor makes a final concession
because of the expectation that the other will not concede
further.

This final concession, resulting in an agreement,

is a commitment that Thomas C. Schelling refers to as an
"irreversible sacrifice of freedom of choice."65 Usually
the actor to make the commitment emerges with the best
terms in the agreement, and the other is forced to make the
best of it or lose face.
A commitment can be enhanced by the public pledge of an
actor's reputation to it and any agreement reached.

Public

exposure to the process and public opinion concerning it
are also crucial to the overall success or failure of
bargaining.

Public opinion and pressure are often utilized

to derail the bargaining process.

If negotiations take

place in secret, none of the normal tactics need be used,
and none of the normal hazards come into play.

63ibid., 21.
64Ibid.
65I b i d . , 22.
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excluding the public both sides reduce the fear of a
stalemate or charges of appeasement through concession.
Done in secret, the public has no knowledge of the process,
tactics, concessions made, how they were reached, or the
actors involved.

By waiting to inform the public until

after an agreement has been reached, the actors force all
concerned to become participants in a done deal.66
A commitment on the part of one actor is also a tactic
designed to leave the other with the decision of whether
the bargaining will result in an agreement.

By making a

commitment an actor is forcing the other party in the
negotiations to accept the terms or risk losing any
agreement and take responsibility for the failure.67 Any
agreement, no matter how small or ambiguous, sets a
precedent and pattern to be followed in future bargaining
by establishing mutual expectations.

This also works by

establishing expectations on the part of the public based
on the commitments made by the actors in any initial
agreement.
This chapter has presented a framework for analyzing
theoretically the conjunction of variables that led to the
1993 peace agreement between Israel and the PLO.

The

theories presented all deal with the origins, management,
and resolution of conflict.

66i b i d . , 28-29.
67I b i d ., 37.

The analysis will be conducted

29

using this multi—theoretical approach so that an
examination of the whole context—
single actor or event—

rather than just a

can be used to study the influence

of variables operating at different levels of analysis.
The microcosmic conflict theory of frustration—
aggression and the macrocosmic theory of revolution are
useful in examining the Palestinian struggle against
Israel.

From its establishment until 1982 the PLO was

engaged in a revolutionary movement using manifest conflict
against Israel.

Beginning in 1987 the locus of the

Palestinian struggle moved to the occupied territories.
All five of Denfronzo's factors:

a tolerant world context,

a political crisis of the state, dissident elite political
movements, unifying motivations of nationalism and
religion, and relative deprivation leading to mass
frustration and participation, were relevant and resulted
in a popular revolutionary uprising, the Intifada.

I will

also argue that these same five factors were present and
can help to explain the "revolutionary" peace agreement
between Israel and the PLO.
Realist theory, with its view of managing conflict
through the use of power to maximize the primary selfinterest of national security, helps to explain the actions
of Israel and Syria in their relations with each other and
other actors.

Adel Safty characterized Israel's

international relations this way:

30
There is probably no clearer example of the pursuit of power
as an instrument of policy to impose a certain balance of
power and accomplish political goals which would otherwise
be impossible through international law and multilateral
treaty channels, than that provided by the establishment and
aggrandizement of Israel whose leaders made of war a prime
instrument of their policy.... What Taylor said about the
Bismarkian vision of nineteenth century Europe is applicable
to the Arab— Israeli conflict.
Citing Bismark's famous
sentence:
"The great questions of our time will not be
settled by resolutions and majority votes— that was the
mistake of the men of 1848 and 1849— but by blood and iron,"
A.J.P. Taylor asks:
"Who can deny that this is true as a
statement of fact."
Certainly not the Palestinians or the
Arabs; not even candid Israeli leaders such as Moshe Sharret
who admitted:
"I have learned that the state of Israel
cannot be ruled in our generation without deceit and
adventurism.
These are historical facts that cannot be
altered."68

Bargaining theory, with its use of the same concepts
and assumptions, is an extension of realist thinking.

It

sets the parameters for an analysis of the tactics used by
Israel, Syria, and, to a lesser extent, the PLO, in the
negotiations that led to the 1993 signing of the
Declaration of Principles.

Using this multi—theoretical

framework, the following chapters examine and analyze the
variables— end of the Cold War and demise of the USSR, the
Second Gulf War, the Intifada— whose conjunction produced
the peace agreement.

68Safty,

"Balance of Power," 53.
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An event such as the peace accord between Israel and
the PLO does not occur in a vacuum.

It takes place in a

larger geopolitical environment that may help to explain
the event.

This chapter examines two of the independent

variables:

the end of the Cold War and the Second Gulf

War.

The End of the Cold War

During the Cold War, international relations were
dominated by the political and ideological confrontation
between the two superpowers, the United States (US) and the
Soviet Union (USSR). This confrontation followed the basic
premises of realism, with influence and control pursued
through a manipulation of political and military power.

In

places such as the Middle East, the confrontation was
pursued via arms transfers and economic aid to exploit
existing conflicts in an attempt to gain spheres of
influence in the rivalry between East and West.

The

alignment of states with one side or the other was seen as
an important symbol "...of success and failure in the
31
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global competition between the United States and the Soviet
Union."69
The primary self-interest for American action in the
Middle East was, and is, to gain and protect access to
energy reserves in the region.

The policy goal of the US

was to establish influence, and possibly even control, over
those who had the energy reserves since "whoever controls
the oil tap in the Middle East will possess sufficient
leverage to dominate the world."70 This desire was
reciprocated by the USSR, if for no other reason than to
counter the US.

Without invading and occupying the region,

the only way to "control the oil tap" was to influence and
control those regimes in possession of the tap.
Competition in this regard was merely an extension of the
political and ideological confrontation between the
superpowers.

Former US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia,

Alexander Kirk, thought it made sense for the US to take
initiative in the region to counter the USSR since "...a
stable world order can be achieved only under the American
system" and only the American system would "...help backward
countries to help themselves in order that they may lay the
foundation for real self-dependence."71

69Barry Buzan, "New Patterns of Global Security in the TwentyFirst Century," International Affairs 67, no. 3 (July 1991):
433.
70Safty,

"Balance of Power," 54.

71Quoted in Noam Chomsky, World Orders Old and New (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1994), 191.
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For the US, countering communist presence and expansion
(as well as nationalist forces hostile to the USA) was
accomplished through the support of a few key states.
Since its creation, Israel has been, and remains, a key
strategic ally in the region.

Washington viewed Israel as

its "...unsinkable aircraft carrier in the Eastern
Mediterranean."72 This notion came from a conclusion by
the National Security Council in January 1958 that the
"logical corollary" of opposition to communism and growing
Arab nationalism that threatened US interests "...would be to
support Israel as the only strong pro-Western Power..." in
the region.73 Turkey and Iran under the Shah were also key
states, each giving the US a military presence on the
border of the USSR.

With the expulsion of Soviet military

presence, the signing of the Camp David peace agreement,
and increased ties with the West, Egypt under Anwar Sadat
replaced Iran after the fall of the Shah.
Soviet interest in the region is often traced back to
traditional Russian concern over the security of its
borders and the desire to gain naval access to the
Mediterranean and Persian Gulf.74 William B. Quandt

72Theodore H. Friedgut, "Israel's Turn Toward Peace," in Israel
Under R a b i n , ed. Robert 0. Freedman (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1995),
74.
73Chomsky, World O r d e r s , 204.
74Avraham Tamir, "The Use of Military Force:
An Israeli
Analysis," in The Middle East in Global P e r spective, eds. Judith
Kipper and Harold H. Saunders (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1991), 221—

2.
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suggests that too much has been made of this assumption.
Quandt believes that Soviet strategic naval interests were
best served through their presence in the Horn of Africa
and South Yemen, where they could control shipping in and
out of the region, and that Soviet actions in the Middle
East were simply the result of Cold War rivalry.75
The emergence of Soviet influence in the rivalry began
in Egypt in the 1950's with the goal of promoting "...ThirdWorld neutrality in order to eliminate Western influence
and presence there."76 The USSR became a major supplier of
arms to, and a source of economic development for, regimes
hostile to the US.

After the Sadat initiative, Iraq (to be

abandoned by the USSR in the Second Gulf War), Libya, South
Yemen, and Syria were the USSR's main allies.

Of these

states, Syria was the actor to play a major role in the
Israeli—Palestinian peace process.
Throughout the Cold War, Soviet economic, political,
and military support was used by Syria to support and
enhance its doctrine of strategic parity.

This doctrine

was a strategy to enable Syria to compete one on one with
Israel following the defection of Egypt from the radical
Arab camp.

The strategy had three basic components.

75william B. Quandt, "U.S.— Soviet Rivalry in the Middle East,"
in East— West Tensions in the Third W o r l d , ed. Marshall D. Shulman
(New York:
W.W. Norton & Company, 1986), 22.
76Jamal R. Nassar, The Palestine Liberation Organization:
From
Armed Struggle to the Declaration of Independence (New York:
Praeger
Publishers, 1991), 158.
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First, arms shipments from the USSR would give Syria the
military hardware needed to close the gap in areas where
Israel had superiority.

Between 1975 and 1982 over $4

billion in arms was shipped to Syria by the USSR.77 This
hardware enabled Syria to engage in limited warfare with
Israel over territory without the prospect of outright
defeat.

Second, the increased military power of Syria

would serve as a deterrent to possible Israeli aggression.
Third, Syria held that no lasting peace could be achieved
given Israel's preponderance of military power and US
support.

Increased Syrian capabilities coupled with Soviet

support would have a positive impact on the Arab position
and increase their bargaining power in any peace
negotiations that might develop.78 With this increased
power, Syria also had the capability to unilaterally derail
any developments that did not take its own interests into
account.
The PLO also benefited from Soviet patronage during the
Cold War.

Prior to 1967, the USSR tended to view the

Palestinian problem as primarily a refugee problem.

After

the 1967 war and Israel's occupation of the West Bank and
Gaza, the USSR supported the PLO in its armed struggle

77Tareq Y. Ismael, International Relations of the Contemporary
Middle East (Syracuse, NY:
Syracuse University Press, 1986), 190.
78Ahmed S. Khalidi and Hussein Agha, "The Syrian Doctrine of
Strategic Parity," in The Middle East in Global Perspective, e d s .
Judith Kipper and Harold H. Saunders (Boulder:
Westview Press,
1991), 189-190.
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against Israel with monetary contributions, arms and
training, and diplomatic support.

The USSR had constantly

demanded that any settlement of the Arab—Israeli conflict
take into account and include Palestinian representation
through the PLO.

The PLO's position was strengthened

through the legitimacy and recognition it received from the
superpower patronage of the USSR.79
The end of the Cold War, and consequently Soviet
support for Syria and the PLO, began when Mikhail Gorbachev
came to power in March 1985.

In a speech to the 27th

Communist Party Congress, Gorbachev outlined his "new
thinking" for the USSR.

Historically, as the examples

above show, the USSR had sought openings where US influence
in particular, and Western influence in general, could be
undermined or replaced by Soviet influence.

Its support of

nationalist forces such as the PLO, or radical regimes such
as Syria, was used to advance its position through spheres
of influence in an attempt to shift the balance of power in
its favor.

Gorbachev's new thinking would subordinate

"...the promotion of revolutionary change and the advancement
of Soviet power in the Third World areas to the pursuit of
domestic objectives and broader foreign policy goals."80

79Tamar Weinstein, "Soviet Union," in Echoes of the Intifada;
Regional Repercussions of the Palestinian— Israeli Co n f l i c t , ed. Rex
Brynen (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1991), 245.
80W. Raymond Duncan and Carolyn McGiffert Ekedahl, Moscow and
the Third World Under Gorbachev (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1990), 71.
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There were four basic tenets to this new thinking.
First, the primary goal was to revitalize and restructure
the seriously weakened USSR economy.

This would

necessitate an international environment conducive to
economic growth through foreign investment and technology,
so improved relations with the West and the US was needed.
Gorbachev stressed a theme of mutual security whereby new
Soviet policies would take into account the views and needs
of other actors.

This gave rise to the third tenet, a

recognition that the future strength of the USSR's economy
would be directly interconnected with the strength and
stability of the international economic system.

Fourth,

the stability of the international economic system depended
in large part upon political and military stability in the
international arena.

A new emphasis would be placed on

diplomacy and the political settlement of regional
conflicts to reduce competition and confrontation with the
West in order to foster the more relaxed international
environment needed for economic growth.81
One means of fostering a more relaxed international
environment was to reestablish diplomatic ties with Israel.
The USSR had broken off diplomatic relations with Israel in
1967 during the Six Day War.

Beginning in 1986, high level

meetings took place between Soviet and Israeli officials
and in 1987 a Soviet consular delegation arrived in Israel.

81I b i d . , 49-52.
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The result of this exchange was the USSR's permission for
massive Jewish emigration to Israel to begin.

This was

seen as a major step in improving relations with Israel and
the West. 82
Concurrent with this move was pressure on radical Arab
client states to moderate their positions in regards to
Israel and the West.
pressure was Syria.

The primary recipient of this
In April 1987 Gorbachev, in a meeting

with Syrian President Hafez al—Asad, let it be known that
Syrian hostility toward Israel was having adverse
repercussions on East—West relations.

Gorbachev stated

that "reliance on military force has completely lost its
credibility as a way of solving the Middle East conflict,"
and that the USSR would cut back its military assistance
that had been the cornerstone of Syria's doctrine of
strategic parity.83 These efforts by Gorbachev were
consistent with the tenets of his "new thinking" for the
USSR.

The priority was to end Cold War competition that

was weakening the economy and seek diplomatic solutions to
regional conflicts that might compromise improving EastWest relations.

The result was the end of the Cold War.

For all of the USSR's clients, the end of the Cold War
meant the end of economic assistance, arms shipments,
diplomatic support, and even deterrence of US and Israeli

82ibid., 120.
83Weinstein,

"Soviet Union," 253.
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policies and actions in the Middle East.

Syria and the PLO

were among the major losers in this reshuffling of the
international political system.84 Many thought that the
end of the Cold War and eventual demise of the USSR would
signal an end to the strong support Israel had always
received from the US, since Israel was no longer needed to
counter Soviet influence in the area.

In actuality, it

signaled an end to any US need to influence or "...woo the
PLO or Arab states away from the Soviet camp, extinguishing
the old argument that only concessions to the PLO could
prevent a pro—Moscow Middle East."85 Aside from the
cessation of the military, political, and economic support
Syria had received from the USSR, the end of the Cold War
and collapse of the communist system also undermined the
legitimacy of Asad's authoritarian one—party political
system in Syria.

The durability of authoritarian regimes

based on secular, radical ideologies was cast into doubt,
and "for Asad, the fate of Ceausescu, Mengistu, Castro or
Saddam Hussein cannot be appealing."86 Asad, always
pragmatic and intent on remaining in power, brought about a
shift in Syrian foreign policy that sought out increased
84Robert J. Leiber, "American Hegemony, Regional Security and
Proliferation in the Post— Cold War International System,"
Contemporary Security Policy 16, no. 1 (April 1995):
2.
85Barry Rubin, Revolution Until Victory?
University Press, 1994), 178.

(Cambridge:

Harvard

86Bradford R. McGuinn, "The Perils of Conventional Wisdom:
A
Reassessment of Syrian Options," Global Affairs 8, no. 1 (Winter
1993):
149.
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ties and cooperation with the West to counter the absence
of Soviet support.

This new approach resulted in Syrian

participation in the Second Gulf War and an even greater
role in the peace negotiations that followed.
The Cold War competition between the US and USSR in the
Middle East for spheres of influence followed the basic
assumptions of realist thought.

Human nature is power

hungry, untrusting, and prone to conflict rather than
cooperation.

Managing this inevitable conflict between

East and West was done by pursuing self-interests through
the manipulation of power.

Gaining client states and the

ability to influence the political, economic, and military
conditions of the Middle East enhanced each actor's power
in the region.

Manipulating this power allowed the USSR to

pursue its goals of securing its southern borders and
gaining access to warm water passages and military bases in
the region.

Manipulating this power allowed the US access

to the abundant energy reserves of the region.

For both

actors, these goals, or self-interests, were seen as vital
to their national security and the preservation of their
respective states.
A change occurred when Gorbachev came to the conclusion
that the crumbling Soviet economy could no longer support
the USSR's Cold War competition with the West.

If the

power was no longer available to "resist the will of others
and impose your will on them," then a new approach was
needed.

This also followed the realist assumption of a

rational actor considering feasible alternatives in light
of existing capabilities.

This new approach consisted of

improving ties with the West, including Israel, and cutting
ties with client states such as Syria, in order to foster a
more stable and peaceful international environment that
would produce Western investment and technology to assist
the failing Soviet economy.

Gorbachev's goal was still the

primary goal of realist thought, to preserve the Soviet
state before it completely collapsed.

Former clients such

as Syria and the PLO were also forced to consider feasible
alternatives to preserve themselves.

For Syria, this also

meant improving ties with the West to replace lost Soviet
support.

The PLO, however, turned to Saddam Hussein of

Iraq.

The Second

Gulf War

"There can be little doubt that the conflict between the un
authorized and US— led Multinational Coalition and Iraq at
the start of 1991, as a result of the Iraqi Ba'athist
regime's decision in August 1990 to invade and annex Kuwait,
has produced profound changes in the political and
diplomatic environment of the Middle East...."87

For the US, multinational action against Iraq

was a

necessity due to the fact that Iraq was set to control one
of the major oil producing states in the Persian Gulf.

87George Joffe, "Middle Eastern Views of the Gulf Conflict and
its Aftermath," Review of International Studies 19, no. 2 (April
1993):
177.
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Secondary reasons included the opportunity to diminish
Iraq's military capability that threatened the balance of
power in the region, and an opportunity to establish
American military presence in the Gulf to counter the
growing influence of resurgent or radical Islam, now
commonly perceived as replacing communism as the greatest
threat against American interests in the region.
For Arab states such as Syria, recently deprived of
Soviet patronage, the Second Gulf War was an "...opportunity
to take sides with the West at a moment when the United
States needed Arab political support."88 As payment for
its cooperation, Syria received between one and two billion
dollars from the Gulf states for participating in the
Multinational Coalition.

Syria also stands to benefit even

more in the long term through improved economic and
political ties with the West.

In addition, with American

support, Syria was able to end the civil war in Lebanon and
put in place there a government compliant with its views.89
Most importantly, by cooperating with the West, President
Asad was able to guarantee that Syria would be a key player
in the peace process that was promised to follow Desert
Storm.
For the PLO, "the 1990— 91 Gulf crisis resulted in one
of the worst setbacks for the Palestinians in modern
88Volker Perthes, "Incremental Change in Syria," Current History
92, no. 570 (January 1993):
24.
89Joffe,

"Middle Eastern Views," 197.
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times."90 The thriving Palestinian community in Kuwait was
destroyed and the financial and diplomatic support the PLO
received from the Gulf states was cut off.

Between 1980—90

it is estimated that the PLO received around ten billion
dollars in direct contributions from the Gulf states.

As a

result of world recession and declining oil revenues, the
annual amount had fallen at the time of the war to around
133 million dollars, but this was still a great loss of
revenue for the PLO.91 The PLO also lost the tax revenue
it had received from Palestinian workers in Kuwait which
was estimated to be fifty million dollars a year.

The

defeat of Iraq also left Yasser Arafat and the PLO
completely isolated politically and diplomatically, no
longer able to benefit from what had been unanimous Arab
support of the PLO in the Palestinian cause and an
international consensus regarding the need for Palestinian
self-determination.

These were the most important

weaknesses leading the PLO to enter secret negotiations
with Israel.
The PLO position was a direct consequence of the end of
the Cold War.

Massive Jewish immigration to Israel and

increased settlement construction coupled with the failure
of PLO diplomatic initiatives and loss of Russian support

90Philip Mattar, "The PLO and the Gulf Crisis," Middle East
Journal 48, no. 1 (Winter 1994):
31.
91Louise Leif, "A New Beginning," U.S. News & World R e p o r t . 13
September 1993, 30.
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caused Arafat to seek out a powerful Arab ally that might
influence Israel and the West in favor of the PLO.

Arafat,

in allying himself and the PLO with Iraq in the Second Gulf
War, made the same mistaken assumptions that Saddam Hussein
did.

Arafat believed that the US would probably not go to

war with Iraq over oil, and if they did, that "...Iraq would
either win or the United States would get bogged down in
the desert."92
At a January 1991 rally in Baghdad shortly before the
bombing started, Arafat said, in effect, if the US wants
war then bring them on:

"Then I say welcome, welcome,

welcome to war...Iraq and Palestine will be together side by
side in battle."93 A month later, at it again, Arafat
proclaimed that "if they want to have O—I—L, then they have
to also take P—L—0," and he called for military attacks on
Israel.94 The PLO's pro—Iraqi position would continue even
after the defeat of the Iraqi army, as exemplified by this
statement from the PLO's Unified National Leadership of the
Uprising in the occupied territories.
Sister Iraq remains steadfast in the face of the most brutal
attack [ever carried out] on a people in modern history.
Its courageous people and army have succeeded in thwarting,
boldly and in the twinkling of an eye, the attempts to
destroy Iraq's ability, its liquidation at the hands of the

92Mattar,

"The PLO and the Gulf Crisis," 37.

93Rubin, Revolution. 183.
94lbid.
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Zionist imperialist interests in the region, and its
subjugation as an American satellite.95

The PLO's position, and its championing of Iraq, were
reflections of popular Palestinian sentiment in the
occupied territories.

Palestinians were growing

increasingly frustrated over the harshness of the Israeli
response to the Intifada and the inability of the Intifada
to produce tangible results.

More than 800 civilians had

been killed since the uprising began and Jewish immigration
and settlement was skyrocketing.

Israeli polls showed that

52 percent of Jewish Israelis supported the expulsion of
the Palestinians and the annexation of the occupied
territories in order to preserve the "...Jewish and
democratic nature of the state...."96
An unscientific telephone poll conducted in the West
Bank revealed that 84 percent of Palestinians considered
Saddam Hussein a national hero, 58 percent supported the
invasion of Kuwait, and 83 percent approved of Arafat's
support of Hussein.97 The primary reason for this popular
support was Hussein's support of the Palestinian cause by
attempting to link any settlement of the Kuwait crisis with
a comprehensive settlement of the Arab—Israeli conflict,
95Shaul Mishal and Reuben Aharoni, Speaking S t o n e s : Communiques
from the Intifada Underground (Syracuse, NY:
Syracuse University
Press, 1994), 188.
96Mattar,
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97I b i d ., 40.
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including the withdrawal of Israel from the occupied
territories as a precursor to Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.
Equally important, howpver, and a source of popular
sentiment for Hussein throughout the Middle East and North
Africa, was Hussein's willingness to stand up to the West
and the US and the near unanimous condemnation by Muslims
of Western military presence on the land of Islam.

Most

people viewed the conflict as a "...hypocritical double
standard in US behavior."98 While the US moved quickly and
forcefully against Iraq in support of United Nations
resolutions, the US had done nothing against Israel in
support of numerous United Nations resolutions condemning
Israel's occupation of the West Bank, Gaza, Golan Heights,
and Jerusalem, not to mention the 1982 invasion of Lebanon.
The preferred outcome for the PLO in particular and
Palestinians in general was some sort of resolution that
accepted Hussein's linkage.
Saddam Hussein's proposed peace initiative of 12 August
1990, linking his withdrawal from Kuwait to the withdrawal
of Israel from the occupied territories was mostly a ploy
to divert attention from his own occupation, but it had the
effect of striking "...a blow for Palestinian liberation
without doing a great deal to accomplish it.

But by

explicitly shifting focus to the Arab— Israeli conflict and
restoring the question of Palestine to pride of place, he

98i b i d . , 39.
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was, on another level, tapping into deep springs of Muslim
concern."99 This would have important repercussions in the
occupied territories where the Islamic Resistance Movement,
Hamas, was already eclipsing the PLO even prior to its loss
of support and funding from the Gulf states.

The Islamist

sentiment toward Israel's occupation of the territories is
reflected in this statement by Shaikh Abd al—Aziz Bin Baz,
a religious scholar in Saudi Arabia:

"The Palestinian

problem is an Islamic problem first and last....

Muslims

must fight an Islamic jihad (holy war) against the Jews
until the land returns to its owners."100
The failure thus far to achieve any Arab or Palestinian
victory against Israel is seen by Islamists to be a result
of Israel sticking to its Jewish religion, while secular
Arabs and the PLO have been unsuccessful due to their
abandonment of Islam as a way of life.
been attributed to the same cause.

Iraq's failure has

Islamists viewed the

Second Gulf War as an excuse for the US to put forces on
the ground and occupy Muslim land.

Even if done to protect

energy reserves at the request of Gulf states, they see it
as a violation of the integrity of Islam.101 Stating that

"J a m e s Piscatori, "Religion and RealPolitik:
Islamic Responses
to the Gulf War," in Islamic Fundamentalisms and the Gulf C r isis, ed.
James Piscatori (New York:
The American Academy of Arts and
Sciences, 1991), 5— 6.
100Ibid., 6.
101Ghassam Salame, "Islam and the West," Foreign Policy 90
(Spring 1993):
28— 29.
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"America has become your God," Safar al—Hawaii, Dean of
Islamic Studies as Umm al—Qura University in Mecca,
chastised Persian Gulf Muslims for putting their faith in
the US rather than in God.102 An Imam at a Riyadh mosque,
echoing this feeling, asked:

"If a dog has come onto your

land, would you invite a lion to get rid of it?"103
These convictions were echoed throughout the Muslim
world, but had a particular resonance in the occupied
territories where Hamas and the PLO had been competing for
the loyalty of the Palestinian people.

Hamas, although

vocal in its opposition to Western presence in the region,
never came out in support of Iraq despite popular sentiment
in Hussein's favor.

By limiting its attack to the US,

Hamas was able to tap into the strong anti-Western mood of
the population without alienating the Gulf states on which
it also depended for funding.

The devastation of PLO

finances as a result of their loss of Gulf funding caused
the PLO to drastically cut back services and payments to
Palestinians in the occupied territories.

This cutback is

estimated to be almost as much as the annual funding the
PLO lost.

Hamas, in contrast, by taking the tack it did,

was able to preserve its funding, estimated at 100 million
dollars annually from the Gulf states, 60 to 70 million of
that from Kuwait alone.

102Piscatori,
103Ibid.

As a result, Hamas stepped into
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the void left by the PLO and significantly increased its
popularity and loyal following in the occupied territories,
directly challenging the PLO for representation of
Palestinians.

Israel perceived a stronger Hamas, coupled

with growing Islamist influence and anti-Western sentiment
across the region, as an even greater threat than the PLO
had been.

Syrian leadership on behalf of the Arab states

at the Madrid Peace Conference following the war presented
Israel with a unified Arab negotiating front attempting the
same sort of linkage that Hussein had.

Peace with Syria

and Israel's other Arab neighbors would be reached through
a comprehensive framework and settlement, with a basic
condition being the withdrawal of Israel from the occupied
territories.

These positions were untenable for Israel in

pursuing its foremost interest, the security of the Jewish
state.

What was needed was an entirely new strategy, one

that would deal with all of these problems at once.

The

PLO would provide the answer.
In terms of realist thought, the manipulation of power
by the US that led to the defeat of Iraq strengthened
American influence and presence in the Middle East and
guaranteed that its primary self-interest— access to the
abundant energy reserves of the region— would not be
threatened.

It also established a balance of power in the

region favorable to the US that might help it in combating
Islamic Fundamentalism, seen by many American officials as
replacing communism as the greatest threat against American
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interests.

For actors such as Syria, this event confirmed

that the best alternative in light of existing capabilities
would be to improve ties with the West.

Besides replacing

lost Soviet patronage, it would give Syria far greater
influence and bargaining power in the peace negotiations
that followed the end of the war.
This chapter has presented an analysis of the influence
of two of the independent variables: the end of the Cold
War and demise of the USSR, and the Second Gulf War.

While

the end of the Cold War was cause for change in the
approach of some actors toward the Arab— Israeli conflict,
in itself it was not responsible for the conflict.
It is not true that the Arab— Israeli conflict is simply a
reflection of the Cold War.
Such a view has been maintained
in the past by both Arabs and Israelis, for it enabled both
sides to diminish their responsibility.
The Cold War did
not create the conflict but, rather, aggravated it.104

The end of the Cold War meant the end of flexibility for
some actors. With independent non-alignment now a thing of
the past, there was no longer the ability to maneuver back
and forth playing the superpowers against one another.
There was a significant "...awareness that Arab options over
regional affairs had been significantly reduced by the
decline of Soviet influence as the Cold War came to an
end."105
104Harkabi,
105Joffe,

Israel's Fateful H o u r , xvii.

"Middle Eastern Views," 183.
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For actors such as Syria, the end of the Cold War meant
the end of superpower patronage and "...that the source of
the almost inexhaustible military support for the Arabs has
now dried up, and the source of almost automatic political
support for their cause has also run low."106 For the PLO,
the end of the Cold War meant that "in the space of a few
short years, almost the entire culture into which the PLO
was born and by which it was nourished has disappeared,"
and in the process "...deprived the PLO of a major moral and
material patron and a kind of echo chamber for the PLO's
old anti— imperialist rhetoric."107
Prior to the end of the Cold War, unilateral moves on
the part of the US were curtailed because of fear of a
Soviet response there or somewhere else in the world.

Now

the US was able to act to make things such as the Second
Gulf War happen in accordance with its own interests.
Soviet interest in fostering peaceful coexistence with the
West in order to help its flagging economy led to
cooperation in executing Desert Storm and in setting up the
peace negotiations that followed.

Russia co—chaired the

opening rounds of the Madrid Peace Conference, and its
presence made it easier for former clients such as Syria to
participate while lessening the perception back home that

106Shimon Peres, Battling for P e a c e , ed. David Landau
Random House, 1995), 276.
107Daniel Williams,
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the whole affair was the US's doing.108

In reality, Syrian

presence was also the result of the US's initiative to
develop a framework for the conference that would include
all the principal actors (except the PLO) in an effort to
set the foundations for a comprehensive peace process and
reward those Arab states who had participated in the
coalition against Iraq.

Israel was unable to object to the

presence of longtime radical foes such as Syria who had
participated in the diminution of Iraq's military power,
since the outcome was seen as being more beneficial to
Kuwait than Israel.
The outcome of the Second Gulf War also had the effect
of depriving the PLO of its backup patron following the end
of the Cold War.

Saddam Hussein's pledges on behalf of the

PLO and the Palestinian struggle to liberate the occupied
territories "...reawoke the old Palestinian dream of finding
an Arab knight on horseback to liberate historical
Palestine from the Zionists."109

In the end, PLO support of

this knight would lead to no patronage at all and the
costly loss of its funding from the oil—rich Gulf states.
Coupled with a growing tide of Islamic radicalism in the
whole region, the effect of PLO losses was to increase
Islamist gains in the occupied territories, a development
detrimental to both the PLO and Israel.

"Israel had

108Steven R. David, "Why the Third World Still Matters,"
International Security 17, no. 3 (Winter 1992— 93):
130.
109Williams,
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countenanced, if not encouraged, the first organizational
efforts of Hamas in the Gaza area, on the grounds that it
would be a counterforce to the PLO."110 This strategy
proved to be seriously flawed in the long run as Hamas, in
conjunction with other radical Islamist movements, proved
to be a much greater security risk for Israel than the PLO
had ever been.
All of these various factors, emerging as influences
due to the independent variables, led Israel and the PLO to
look for a new strategy to solve their mutual problems.
This strategy would take the form of bargaining in secret
to produce the September 1993 peace accord.

For Israel,

this tactic produced results while staying within its
realist framework of protecting, and in this case even
enhancing, its security.

If there were any final lessons

gained from the end of the Cold War and the Second Gulf
War, they are probably best summed up by India's Foreign
Minister who said, "the lesson of the Gulf War is not to
fight the United States unless you have nuclear weapons."111

nOpriedgut,
1:11Leiber,

"Israel's Turn Toward Peace," 75.

"American Hegemony," 4.

CHAPTER

THE

LOCAL

4

CONTEXT

The Arab struggle against Israel began even before the
establishment of the state of Israel in 1948.

In the

1960's however, the struggle took on new meaning, and new
looks, due in large part to the leadership of President
Gamel Abdel Nasser of Egypt.

Nasser called a summit

conference of Arab heads of state in Cairo from January 13—
16, 1964 to address Arab concerns over Israel's plan to
divert water from the Jordan River for irrigation projects
within Israel. It was at this conference that Nasser
proposed the formation of a "Palestinian entity" to
represent Palestinian interests in the Arab struggle
against Israel.112
Arab reaction to this proposal was mixed.

Amin al—

Hafez, President of Syria, "...actually suggested making the
West Bank and the Gaza Strip the territorial domain of a
Palestinian state."113 This was the first time that these
areas were proposed as being the place for any sort of

112Brecher,

"Middle East Subordinate Systems," 134.

113Nassar, Palestine Liberation Organization, 20.
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Palestinian autonomy.

King Hussein of Jordan worried that

any organized Palestinian activity seeking a state might
jeopardize the stability of Jordan owing to its large
Palestinian population, and also undermine Jordan's control
over the West Bank.

King Saud called for establishing a

Palestinian government in exile.

The leaders of Tunisia

and Algeria advocated the formation of a Palestinian
national liberation movement, which would be the eventual
result of Nasser's proposal.

Nasser, however, came to view

the Palestinian movement as competition for leadership in
the struggle against Israel and had really only wanted the
"symbolic creation of a limited official institution with
propaganda functions only."114
The official statement of the conference recommended
that:
Mr. Ahmad al— Shukairy, Palestine's representative at the
Arab League, should resume contacts with the member states
and with the Palestinian people for the purpose of
establishing a sound basis for organizing the Palestinian
people in order to enable them to assume their duties in
liberating their homeland and determining their destiny.115

On 24 February 1964 in Jerusalem, al—Shukairy announced
that a draft constitution of twenty—nine articles had been
written and included the basic principles for Palestinian
liberation.

In May of the same year, a Palestine National

114I b i d . , 20.
115Ibid.

Council (PNC) of 422 Palestinians selected by committees
from the Palestinian populations of the various Arab states
met in Jerusalem to discuss the draft constitution.

On 1

June 1964, the PNC announced the following decisions:
1) Proclaimed the existence of the PLO.
2) Elected Ahmad al— Shukairy as the first chairman of the
Executive Committee of the PLO.
3) Elected Abdul Jaleed Shuman as chairman of the Palestine
National Fund.
4) That it had transformed itself into the First National
Congress of the PLO.
5) Authorized the chairman to select an executive committee
of the PLO consisting of fifteen Palestinian
representatives.116

This marked the official beginning of organized Palestinian
resistance against Israel, a development due in large part
to a younger generation of Palestinians "...dedicated to the
principle that national liberation can only be achieved by
armed struggle."117
This struggle would be transformed again following the
1967 Six Day War in which Israel captured and occupied the
West Bank and Gaza Strip, considered now to be the
territorial base for any Palestinian autonomy, in addition
to the Sinai and the Golan Heights.

For Israel, these

moves were seen as necessary in order to guarantee its
security.

As a result of the war, Israel acquired control

over territory three times the size of the state before the
war started and gave it more defensible borders.
116ibid.
117l b i d . , 1.

Yitzhak
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Rabin, Israeli Chief of Staff during the war, described
Israel's new borders as essential to security because the
"present borders run along natural barriers:

Egypt— the

canal; Jordan— the Jordan River, a less impressive barrier
than the Suez Canal but nevertheless a barrier; and with
Syria, there will no longer be a need to climb up
mountains."118 The newly acquired territory was now a
strategic asset for Israel, and not one that it wanted to
give up.
The occupation of the West Bank and Gaza galvanized
Palestinian resistance.

Prior to the war, the PLO under

al—Shukairy had pursued a strategy of regular military
warfare against Israel to be carried out in large part by
the Arab states.

The Arab defeat marked a shift in PLO

strategy toward guerrilla insurgency and terrorism as the
principal form of resistance.

This shift occurred in 1968

when Arafat's Fatah faction, George Habash's Popular Front
for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and Na'if
Hawatima's Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
(DFLP), entered the PLO.

In 1969, Arafat was elected

Chairman of the Executive Committee, a position he still
holds today.

From their point of view, the only

appropriate method of resistance to the Israeli occupation

118Quoted in Brecher,
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was an armed struggle using guerrilla insurgency and
terrorism.119
The PLO's guerrilla operations and terrorist attacks
were generally carried out from bases outside the occupied
territories.

Prior to 1971 Jordan was the base for the PLO

until being ousted from there in what was basically a civil
war between the PLO and King Hussein.

The PLO then moved

to Lebanon until being driven from there as well in 1982 by
Israel.

Operating outside of the occupied territories, the

PLO did not have much of a following or any institutional
representation in the territories until after the October
197 3 Arab—Israeli war.

The Rabat Arab Summit's declaration

that the PLO would be the "sole, legitimate representative
of the Palestinian people," and Arafat's appearance before
the United Nations General Assembly in 1974 elevated the
status of both the PLO and Arafat and gained them an
increased following and loyalty in the territories.

In

1973, the PNC established the Palestine National Front
(PNF) in the occupied territories to give the PLO
institutional representation and allow it to play a larger
role in local Palestinian politics.120
This increased presence and influence in the
territories coupled with the increasing international
119Joshua Teitelbaum and Joseph Kostiner, "The West Bank and
Gaza:
The PLO and the Intifada," in Revolutions of the Late
Twentieth Century, e d s . Jack A. Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr, and
Farrokh Moshiri (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1991), 306.
120I b i d . , 307.
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legitimacy of PLO policies and actions was cause for
concern on the part of Israel.

In 1982, Israel invaded

Lebanon, the location of PLO headquarters and its military
base, in an attempt to crush the PLO.

Israel felt that if

it were successful in eliminating the PLO, "...it could, with
far less resistance, implement its plans for the occupied
territories...."121 Former Israeli Defense Force (IDF)
education officer Mordechai Bar—on wrote in the October
1982 issue of New Outlook that "there is no doubt that the
central aim was to deal a crushing blow to the national
aspirations of the Palestinians and to their very existence
as a nation endeavoring to define itself and gain the right
to self-determination."122
The effect was just the opposite of what the Israelis
had hoped for.

The war in Lebanon, which was supposed to

destroy the PLO and its infrastructure and in doing so,
deprive Palestinians in the territories of their legitimate
representative, only led to increased support for the PLO
and a strong surge in Palestinian nationalism.

Mayors from

towns in the territories and the Supreme Islamic Council of
Jerusalem even went so far as to send letters to the United
Nations reiterating their recognition of the PLO as the
only representative of the Palestinian people and pledged

121Don Peretz, Intifada;
Westview Press, 1990), 19.
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South End Press, 1983), 203.
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their continuing support for the organization in its
struggle against Israel.123 With the defeat and ouster of
the PLO from Lebanon, Palestinians in the occupied
territories, while continuing to support the PLO, began to
realize that liberation was not forthcoming and started
paying more attention to their own conditions and what
might be done about them.

The

Intifada

Conditions in the occupied territories had been
steadily declining since occupation in. 1967.

During the

first twenty years of the occupation, Israel had
requisitioned nearly half the land in the West Bank and
one—third of the land in Gaza for Jewish settlement and
usage.124 This loss of land meant the loss of the
agricultural economic base upon which the territories had
been dependent.

It was a part of the overall Israeli

policy to prevent the development of an independent
Palestinian economic base and infrastructure and promote
dependence upon Israel.

Palestinians were a source of

cheap labor for Israel and provided an immediate market for
Israeli goods.
Palestinian labor in Israel, while giving Palestinians
the currency to buy Israeli goods, was also a source of tax

123ibid., 205.
124Peretz,
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revenue.

Between 1967— 87 more than one billion dollars

were deducted from the wages of workers for unemployment
benefits for which they were not even eligible.

An

additional 800 million dollars in taxes were collected,
representing two and a half times the total investments
made by Israel in the occupied territories over that same
period.125 This outward flow of resources, coupled with a
decline in employment both in Israel and the Gulf states,
led to an economic slowdown and a two percent annual
decline in the standard of living of Palestinians.126
Combined with increases in education and a population
explosion, the economic problems greatly contributed to
relative deprivation and mass frustration.
The overall population in the occupied territories grew
by just over fifty percent in the period between occupation
and the outbreak of the Intifada.

This increase led to a

much larger proportion of young people.

By 1985, one—half

of the population in the occupied territories was under the
age of fourteen, and one—third was between the ages of
fifteen and thirty—four.127

In Gaza, sixty percent of the

population was under fifteen years of age, and two-thirds
of the total population was male.128 The increasing
125Bill and Springborg,

Politics in the Middle E a s t . 330.

126Tietelbaum and Kostiner,

"West Bank and Gaza," 303.

127I b i d .
128Sara Roy, "The Gaza Strip:
Past, Present, and Future,"
Current History 93, no. 580 (February 1994):
68.

population and decreasing land due to Israeli acquisition
also greatly increased the density.

The Jabalya refugee

camp in Gaza for example, has a population density of
133,400 people per square mile, over twice the density of
Manhattan in New York.

Israel, by comparison, has a

population density of eighty people per square mile.129
The increases in population were paralleled by
increases in education.

After 1967 seven universities

opened in the occupied territories.

In the 1970's there

were only 1000 students attending a university.

By the

early 1980's there were 7,500 university students in the
occupied territories. By the end of the decade there were
10,000 in the West Bank alone, with 4000 graduates per
year.130 Less than fifteen percent of these graduates were
able to find employment commensurate with their
qualifications.

In 1985 there were 4000 unemployed

university graduates.

By the time of the outbreak of the

Intifada that number had more than doubled.131 This gap
between education and expectations and actual employment
opportunities coupled with frustration over the continuing
occupation "...nourished a climate of political radicalism"
that was easily transformed into militant action.132
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The occupied territories had a history of civil
disobedience even prior to the outbreak of the Intifada.
The first mass demonstration in the occupied territories
was started by students in December 1968 and lasted for
four months.

In 1974 another demonstration occurred; it

lasted for two weeks and marked the first time that the IDF
imposed a curfew on the occupied territories in order to
control the population and put down the demonstrations.
The largest, longest lasting, and most violent
demonstration prior to the Intifada occurred in 1976.

In

February the West Bank had violent demonstrations and
general strikes in protest over an Israeli court ruling
that allowed Jews to pray at the al—Aqsa Mosque.

In July

more demonstrations broke out to protest an increase in the
sales tax and then continued through the end of the year.133
In December 1986, following the deaths of two students
killed in clashes at Bir Zeit University, the occupied
territories erupted in mass demonstrations that lasted for
ten days.

On 18 May 1987 six members of the Islamic Jihad

movement escaped from Gaza central prison and on August 8
assassinated an officer of the IDF in Gaza.134 In September
a Palestinian stone—thrower was killed by the IDF.

On

October 1, three Palestinians were killed trying to run a
roadblock by the IDF, and later that week five more were

133Nassar, Palestine Liberation Organization, 39.
134Mishal and Aharoni, Speaking S t o n e s . 25.
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killed in a shoot-out with the IDF.135 On December 8, an
Israeli citizen was stabbed to death in a Gaza market.

On

December 9, rioting broke out in the Jabalya refugee camp
after four residents were killed and another seven injured
in a traffic accident near the Erez checkpoint which was
rumored to be an Israeli act of revenge for the stabbing
victim.
Intifada.

This incident marks the official beginning of the
The next day, massive riots and demonstrations

broke out all over Gaza and eventually spread to the West
Bank as well.
While the immediate source of the Intifada might have
been a traffic accident, "the root causes of the uprising
were embedded in twenty years of Israeli occupation and
Israeli policies aimed at undermining the material and
national existence of the Palestinians in their own
land."136 Generally translated in the West as "uprising",
the literal meaning of Intifada is "shaking off",137 in this
case, the shaking off of the colonial style occupation of
the Israelis.

"Unlike classical patterns of colonialism,

the Israeli occupation failed to win the sympathy or

135Helena Cobban, "The Palestinians:
From the Hussein— Arafat
Agreement to the Intifada," in The Middle East From the Iran-Contra
Affair to the Intifada, ed. Robert 0. Freedman (Syracuse, NY:
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support of any meaningful sector of the occupied
population."138
In fact, not only were they not willing to support it,
a growing number of Palestinians were willing to die in the
fight against occupation.

In the first three months of the

Intifada 111 Palestinians were killed and another 1000
wounded.139 The majority of these dead and wounded were
young men who were followers of one of the Islamist
movements.

The Influence of Hamas
The Islamist movements in the occupied territories all
emerged from local chapters of the Muslim Brotherhood, the
oldest and strongest of all Islamic groups.

The Muslim

Brotherhood was founded in Egypt in 1928 to promote a
return to Islamic values and society with the goal of
establishing an Islamic state in order to combat the
growing influence of Western powers in the region.140 This
goal is echoed by all the Islamist groups who argue "...that
the cause of all political, economic, and social conflicts
engulfing the world today lies in the absence of this
state."141
138Abu—Amr, Islamic Fundamentalism, 53.
139Tietelbaum and Kostiner,
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During the first ten years of Israeli occupation Islam
did not constitute much of a unifying motivator for
resistance.

Toward the end of the 1970's a local chapter

of the Muslim Brotherhood emerged in Gaza under the
leadership of Shaikh Ahmad Yasin.142 Prior to the Intifada
the Brotherhood refrained from violent confrontation with
Israel and concentrated instead on establishing political
and social welfare networks in Gaza.

Yasin's movement, the

Islamic Assembly, was successful in making inroads into a
majority of the local mosques and gained control over
administrative and student groups at the Islamic University
in Gaza.

These moves were encouraged by Israeli

authorities who saw increased Islamic influence as
decreased support for the PLO and its secular revolt.143
The Brotherhood, which emphasized that the way to
change society was to reform the individual, would
eventually be transformed by the emergence of a second
Islamic movement.

Membership in this second movement

consisted of ex—Brotherhood members who felt that the
Brotherhood was not confrontational enough in its approach
to Israel.

This rival movement, bolstered by members from

the religious wing of Arafat's Fatah, called for jihad
142Jean Francois Legrain, "A Defining Moment:
Palestinian
Islamic Fundamentalism," in Islamic Fundamentalisms and the Gulf
Cr i s i s , ed. James Piscatori (New York:
The American Academy of Arts
and Sciences, 1991), 72.
143F. Robert Hunter, The Palestinian Uprising:
A War by Other
Means, rev. and exp. ed. (Berkeley:
University of California Press,
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against Israel and advocated violent attacks against the
IDF and Jews.

This new approach signaled the beginning of

the implementation of Islam as an ideology and unifying
motivator in the resistance against Israeli occupation.144
The movement eventually became known as the Brigades of
Islamic Jihad, or Islamic Jihad, and they were responsible
for the attacks against Israeli forces mentioned previously
that set the stage for the Intifada.
The Brigades of Islamic Jihad were violently crushed
and their leaders deported by the IDF in the first few
months of the uprising.

Out of this leadership vacuum the

Islamic Resistance Movement, known by its Arabic acronym
Hamas, emerged in February 19 88.145

Initially Hamas

recruited individuals from the Brotherhood, but a few weeks
later the Brotherhood "formally adopted Hamas as its
militant arm."146 Hamas assumed the Islamic Jihad's
principle of armed struggle against Israel and the
Brotherhood was transformed from a political and social
movement into a revolutionary one.

Hamas operated

separately from the secular factions, who reported to the
PLO's umbrella Unified National Leadership of the Uprising
(UNLU).

The UNLU was established by the PLO shortly after

the Intifada began to capitalize on the uprising and
attempt to gain some control over it.
144Legrain,
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Hamas was critical of the UNLU, and of the PLO in
particular, because "it is an organization that does not
serve God," only its own leadership.147 Hamas was also
adamantly opposed to any sort of negotiated settlement and
continued to expound the principle of armed struggle to
overthrow the state of Israel and establish an Islamic
state in its place.

Hamas published a list of things the

PLO would need to do before it could be accepted by the
Islamist movement.

These things included the following:

1) The PLO must renounce every commitment it has
made...especially as regards the political solution or the socalled peaceful solution.
2) The PLO must extricate itself from the international
political efforts that all world powers are making....
3) The PLO must oust from its ranks every group belonging to
those...regimes...or international p o w e r s .
4) The PLO must reorganize itself, so that it becomes a
resistance movement, not a political organization....
5) The PLO must forget the battle for its own interests....
6) The PLO must go back to view the Palestinian issue as an
issue of occupied territories and a refugee people, and not
an issue of leaders devoting themselves to agreements and
disagreements....
7) The PLO must consider itself the representative of all
the Palestinian people, including those who adhere to Islam
and who are committed to it.
8) The PLO must include in its fold every son of the Islamic
nation, and must consider all Islamic movements that are
committed to Islam its strategic depth in its battle for
civilization.148

Even with the criticism from Hamas, the PLO and its
UNLU were able to control the Intifada and command the
loyalty of the majority of the population for the first few
years of the uprising.
147Abu— Amr,

That control would begin to crumble

Islamic Fundamentalism, 29.

148Ibid., 50.

in 1990, and totally collapse following the Second Gulf
War.

In 1990 two incidents took place that greatly

elevated the stature of Hamas.

The first was the killing

of seven Palestinian workers and the wounding of ten others
in an attack by a single Israeli settler in May.

Mass

rioting followed, with another seven killed and 500 wounded
in clashes with the IDF.

The second occurred in October at

the esplanade of al—Haram al—Sharif, the location of the
al—Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock.

Clashes there

produced twenty—one dead and 150 wounded and was followed
by a strict curfew.

In the aftermath, Hamas was successful

in arguing to the Palestinian people that these incidents
showed that "...our fight with Zionism is a fight between
Islam and Judaism."149
Hamas called for an even more radical approach and an
escalation in violent attacks against the IDF and Jewish
settlers.

The PLO was hesitant to support anything like

this, since it would hurt its status in the international
arena, particularly with the US with whom it was trying to
establish a dialogue for possible negotiations.

As a

result, the PLO was discredited in the eyes of many
Palestinians and lost support.

After these incidents,

Hamas was thought to have the loyalty of more than 50
percent of the Palestinian population.150 The resulting

149Legrain,
150Ibid.

"A Defining Moment," 83.
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conflict between Hamas and the PLO eventually led to direct
confrontations between followers of the two groups in the
territories.

Recognizing that such conflict played into

the hands of the Israelis and would eventually destroy the
Intifada, the PLO and Hamas agreed to coordinate policies
through joint committees.

Hamas ended up controlling these

as well and virtually eclipsed the PLO as the main actor in
the occupied territories.
Apart from its loss of funding and international
stature as a result of the Second Gulf War, the eclipse of
the PLO was furthered by its support of a negotiated
settlement that would give it some autonomy in the occupied
territories.

Hamas had long held that all of Palestine was

Muslim land, that Israel has no right to exist, and that
"...no one has the right to concede any part of Palestine and
[Hamas] considers any political settlement that leaves
Israel intact a matter of treason."151 This stance coupled
with a deteriorating economy in the occupied territories
and the absence of PLO monetary support only increased
frustration, and led to growing support for Hamas which was
"...expressed in increased mosque attendance and in the
spread of Islamic norms and dress codes."152 For Israel,
this growing support meant that it would face greater
numbers of increasingly hostile Palestinians in the

151Abu— Amr,
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occupied territories.

When combined with Hamas's principle

of refusing to negotiate with Israel, Israeli officials
found it virtually impossible to orchestrate any kind of
settlement that would bring about a peaceful resolution to
the Intifada.

A new approach was needed that would

neutralize Hamas and its influence in the occupied
territories, and that approach would be to pursue separate
and secret negotiations with the PLO.
The Intifada experience is best explained by the
revolutionary conflict theory presented in the second
chapter.

Demographic expansion brought a significant

increase in the proportion of young people in the
population.

Continued occupation and expanding Jewish

settlements, increased education and decreased employment
opportunities, and an overall economic decline contributed
to relative deprivation resulting in mass frustration and
participation in the uprising.

A dissident elite political

movement to motivate the masses emerged in Hamas, which
also presented Islam as the principal unifying motivator
for the Intifada.

The state crisis took the form of

colonial occupation by Israel that was seen as unjust and
immoral by the Palestinians.

A permissive and tolerant

world context was created by worldwide media reports
sympathetic to the Palestinian struggle for selfdetermination .
The struggle was not without cost however.

By the end

of September 1990, 861 Palestinians had been killed and

101,500 wounded since the beginning of the Intifada.

Later

that year the IDF reported that it had arrested 70,000
Palestinians and deported 65 since the uprising began.153
The Intifada upset Israel's preponderance of power over the
occupied territories and was very costly in both political
and financial terms.

It forced Israel to recognize that it

could neither continue the occupation in its present form
nor annex the occupied territories as many conservative
Israeli leaders had hoped to do.

The success of the

Intifada reflected the fundamental law that any colonial
occupation can only "...be defended and maintained
successfully as long as the benefits a colonial power
derives from the colonized exceed the costs."154
The decline of the PLO and its loss of support in the
occupied territories was a dream come true for many
Israelis.

The ascension of Hamas to take the place of the

PLO, however, was a nightmare for those responsible for the
security of Jewish settlers and the safety of the IDF in
the occupied territories.

With Hamas's more radical

approach and advocacy of violent attacks on soldiers and
settlers alike, the IDF found it could do nothing except
wait for the next attack to happen.

This scenario created

the necessity for some new tactic to deal with Hamas and

153Legrain,
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the escalating violence in the occupied territories.

The

tactic would be the same as Israel's response to the
environment created by the end of the Cold War and the
Second Gulf War, a secret deal with the PLO, which in this
case would relieve Israel of the responsibility of dealing
with Hamas and place that in the hands of the PLO.

For the

PLO, its decline and eventual eclipse by Hamas necessitated
a separate deal to rescue it from irrelevance.

This

outcome reflects the importance of the influence of the
Intifada, the third independent variable, in the creation
of an environment that led to the 1993 peace accord between
Israel and the PLO.

CHAPTER

THE MOVE

5

TOWARDS

PEACE

The Madrid Peace Conference, co—chaired by the US and
Russia, began on 30 October 1991.

The framework for

negotiations agreed to at the conference was for the US to
host a series of bilateral meetings bringing together
Israel with Syria, Lebanon, and a joint delegation
representing Jordan and the Palestinians of the occupied
territories.

The purpose of the talks between Israel and

the Arab states would be to work out separate peace
treaties.

The Israeli and joint Jordanian—Palestinian

meetings would set the parameters for a phase of self-rule
in the occupied territories to last five years.

Within

three years of the beginning of the five year period,
negotiations for a final settlement of the occupied
territories would begin.

The Palestinian delegation,

without Jordan as agreed to in Madrid, held eleven meetings
with Israeli officials in Washington during 1992 and
1993.155

155Rubin, Revolution. 190.
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These negotiations quickly bogged down, largely due to
Syrian pressure that all Arab negotiations with Israel be
coordinated so that Israel was faced with a united Arab
bargaining front that would produce a comprehensive
settlement beneficial to all the Arab parties.

The PLO,

although able to advise the Palestinian delegation, was for
all intents and purposes left out of the process.

They

were under pressure, however, not to derail the
negotiations as the Gulf states had promised to renew PLO
funding if a settlement were reached between Israel and the
Palestinians.

This put the PLO in an awkward position,

summed up by one PLO official as being "between the options
of suicide and suicide."156
Arafat was worried that any deal made between Israel
and the Palestinian delegation would leave the PLO
completely out and virtually ensure its extinction.

During

its almost thirty year history the PLO had employed a
variety of strategies, ranging from guerrilla warfare and
terrorism to seeking the patronage of Saddam Hussein to
supporting the Intifada, none of which had produced
tangible results.

If a deal were to be made, Arafat wanted

some sort of solution that would put him and the PLO in
charge of any self-rule arrangement in the occupied
territories.

The turning point for the PLO was the June

156i b i d . , 187.
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1992 election of a Labor Alignment government in Israel
under the leadership of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and
Foreign Minister Shimon Peres.

Rabin and Peres had run on

a peace platform and promised that some sort of agreement
with the Palestinians would be made concerning the occupied
territories.

In 1993 the Israeli Knesset repealed a law

barring any Israeli contact or dialogue with the PLO, and
officials from the Labor Alignment began meeting with PLO
officials.157
There were three contending Israeli military doctrines
concerning the occupied territories following the outbreak
of the Intifada. They were:
1) The occupied territories constitute the most important
factor in the defense strategy for the next war.
They must
be kept under Israeli control, even if that means no peace.
Israel should adopt Kissinger's strategy that no war is
better for Israel than no peace.
2) There should be a withdrawal from some or most of the
territories, under specified security arrangements.
This
would include some sort of autonomy for the Palestinians.
3) The territories are a security burden; they threaten
internal security and increase the likelihood of war.
This
doctrine does not object to the formation of a Palestinian
state so long as adequate security arrangements are m a d e . 158

The move by Rabin and Peres to conduct a dialogue with the
PLO was a reflection of both the second and third
doctrines.

Recognizing that the territories were becoming

157ibid., 190.
158Azmi Bishara, "The Third Factor," in Intifada:
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Praeger Publishers, 1990), 276.
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a security burden, but rejecting the idea of an independent
Palestinian state, they pursued a policy of allowing
limited autonomy for the Palestinians under the realization
that an agreement with the PLO was the "...only antidote to
the growing Islamist radicalism among Palestinians."159
Coupled with concern over the rise of radical Islamist
actions in the occupied territories was a concern over the
future demographics of the occupied territories.

Israeli

demographers had concluded that "...the current generation of
Palestinians was sufficiently large to produce a
Palestinian majority in the next generation..." that could
not be offset by massive Jewish immigration and would
eventually threaten the Jewish identity of the state.160
As the dialogue with the PLO was beginning, the
negotiations in Washington were continuing, but not to
Israel's satisfaction.

Syria continued to stress the need

for a united Arab stand against Israel in the bargaining,
reflecting President Asad's deeply held belief "...that any
settlement with Israel had to be comprehensive— Syria,
Lebanon, Jordan and the Palestinians had to sign
together...."161 Syria's delegation to the Madrid conference
conveyed Asad's belief by officially proposing to Israel

159Ghassan Salame,
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35.
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161Michael Parks,
September 1993, 3(H).

"Giving Peace a Chance," Los Angeles T i m e s . 14
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the "...readiness to trade 'total' peace for total
withdrawal" from all occupied territory, including Lebanon
and the Golan Heights.162 This essentially left Israel with
two choices. Either continue the negotiations up against a
united Arab front which placed a great deal of pressure on
Israel, or pursue a separate deal with the PLO on limited
self-government that would not place any immediate demands
on Israel.163 Israel chose the latter.

This move would

have the added benefit of placing the responsibility of
controlling Hamas in the occupied territories with the PLO.
Over a period of eight months, Israel and the PLO held
a series of eighteen secret meetings, fourteen of them in
Oslo, Norway.164 These talks were begun after the Norwegian
Institute for Applied Science offered to facilitate them.
Peres favored Norway because they had agreed to keep the
negotiations secret even from the US.

Norway's Foreign

Minister, Johan Jorgen Holst, aided by four mediators and
his wife (a Middle East specialist), hosted the meetings
that took place in Oslo.

The meetings began on 20 January

1993 with the PLO represented by Abu Mazin, a PLO Executive
Committee member; Abu Ala, Director General of the PLO
Economic Department and a member of Fatah's Central

162Eliahu Salpeter,
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Committee; and Nabil Sha'th, the chair of the PNC's Central
Committee and a Fatah Central Committee member.

By May

Peres felt enough progress had been made to bring in an
official Israeli presence and Uri Savir, Director General
of Israel's Foreign Ministry, arrived to continue
bargaining on Israel's behalf.
Syria continued to play a role even in these secret
negotiations.

Whenever some impasse was reached with the

PLO, Peres would have word passed to the PLO that progress
had been made with Syria and Israel might conclude a "...deal
with Syria instead of concluding the accord with the
PLO."165 A draft agreement of the Declaration of Principles
was reached in July, and on August 19 a final agreement was
reached and a small signing ceremony held with Peres in
attendance.166 Informing Secretary of State Warren
Christopher of the agreement on August 27, Peres played the
Syrian card again, saying that "we believe that the
progress with the Palestinians will help to spur the
Syrians toward progress, too."167
According to Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, "the conduct of
an effective diplomacy is said to be difficult, if not
impossible, if it must be subject, both in its conception
and execution, to the continuous scrutiny of public

165Peres, Battling for P e a c e . 299.
166Rubin, Revolution, 197.
167Peres, Battling for Pea c e , 305.

opinion...."168 Secret negotiations for the Israeli—PLO
accord were certainly a necessity for their success.

Had

the Islamist factions of the Palestinians, or even Syria,
found out about the pending deal it is probable they would
have taken measures to stop it, even if it meant getting
rid of Arafat.

In signing the Declaration of Principles,

Arafat destroyed what was left of Arab unity and broke up
the united Arab negotiating front put in place by Asad.
This new deal gave Israel the chance to announce a major
breakthrough in the pursuit of Arab—Israeli peace without
having to make any concessions.

Reflecting on the

negotiations, Yoel Singer, an Israeli Foreign Ministry
legal advisor who took part in the talks, commented that
the "...success in achieving the Declaration of Principles
resulted mostly from the fact that there was no media
coverage, and thus we had freedom to negotiate without our
positions hardening through exposure."169
An interesting aspect of the 1993 agreement is its
striking similarity to the tactics and outcome of the Camp
David agreement between Israel and Egypt.

The Geneva Peace

Conference, ongoing since the October 1973 war, had
produced no results for Egyptian President Anwar Sadat.
Feeling that "...there was a need to try a completely new
approach which would bypass all formalities and procedural

168Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Contending T h e o r i e s . 111.
169Parks,

"Giving Peace a Chance," 2(H).
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technicalities..." Sadat initiated secret meetings with
Israel in an attempt to make a breakthrough.170 Sadat hoped
that a separate agreement made directly with Israel would
force Jordan and Syria to go along with the deal once talks
resumed in Geneva.

Sadat needed an agreement with Israel

in order to obtain the patronage of the US.

Israeli Prime

Minister Menachem Begin
"...saw a golden opportunity 'to use every ruse to sabotage
the peace efforts' leading to Geneva and to promote Israel's
long-standing goal of separating Egypt from the other Arab
states as a means of weakening Arab bargaining power and
making it easier for Israel to hold on to the remainder of
the occupied territories...."171

These tactics were almost identical to those of the
negotiations that led to the Israeli—Palestinian peace
accord and produced the same result, the removal of an
enemy from the playing field and the split of the united
Arab bargaining front.

The agreement legitimizes the idea

of normal relations and puts pressure on the other party to
go along or be seen as against the concept of peace.
In negotiations such as the ones that led to the 1993
peace accord "...agreement all too often becomes an end in
itself."172 Arafat needed an agreement, any agreement, to
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reaquire legitimacy and funding in order to save himself
and the PLO.

When agreement becomes an end in and of

itself the problems that are agreed upon "...are often
soluble only because they are inconsequential."173 The
Declaration of Principles makes no mention of the important
issues in the Israeli—Palestinian conflict:

the right of

return for refugees, future borders, the issue of
settlements, the status of Jerusalem.174 Agreements such as
this one, "...rather than contributing to a solution of the
real issues, becomes a means of postponing coming to grips
with them."175
The bargaining theory presented in the second chapter
helps to explain many aspects of the negotiations that
produced the peace agreement between Israel and the PLO.
In light of the three independent variables— end of the
Cold War and the demise of the USSR, Second Gulf War, the
Intifada— the parties to the Madrid Conference followed
Morgenthau's four basic tasks of diplomacy in setting the
stage for bargaining.

Each actor determined its own

objectives and those of the other actors in relation to the
amount of power available to pursue them.

These different

objectives were then analyzed to determine if any

173Ibid.
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compatibility existed, and if so, how bargaining might be
used to reach the complementary objectives.
This process was equally important to both Israel and
the PLO.

Israel's primary objective was to prevent any

collective Arab action that might result in the loss of
territory that would diminish Israel's security.

The

united Arab bargaining front might also result in
collective Arab action that would put Palestinians in the
occupied territories in charge of limited autonomy and
leave the PLO out of the process.
alternative to the PLO.

This was an unacceptable

By pursuing a separate agreement,

both the PLO and Israel were able to avoid these bad
alternatives.

Israel was able to take advantage of a

weakened PLO and exploit its relative power gained after
the end of the Cold War and the Second Gulf War.

Without

Soviet or Iraqi patronage, the PLO no longer had the means
to influence Israeli action through coercive diplomacy.
The explicit bargaining that took place in secret in
Norway allowed the PLO to make the necessary concessions to
seal an agreement with Israel without public opinion
jeopardizing the outcome.

In waiting to announce the

agreement until after it was completed, and publicly
pledging their reputations on it, Rabin, Peres, and Arafat
forced the rest of the world to go along with the deal or
be seen as opposing a peaceful settlement to the Israeli—
Palestinian conflict.

CH A P T E R

6

CONCL US IO N

This thesis has presented a qualitative theoretical
analysis of the influence of three variables— the end of
the Cold War and the demise of the USSR, the Second Gulf
War, and developments in the occupied territories
culminating in the Intifada— whose conjunction produced the
conditions that led to the 13 September 1993 signing of the
Declaration of Principles between Israel and the PLO.
The end of the Cold War deprived two key actors, Syria
and the PLO, of their superpower patron and military
supporter and created the permissive environment needed by
the US to lead the Multinational Coalition in the Second
Gulf War against Iraq.

Without Russian deterrence, the US

was free to pursue whatever policies most benefited it and
Israel.

This war cost the PLO the Support of another

patron, Saddam Hussein of Iraq, and in supporting Hussein
in his invasion of Kuwait and fight against the coalition
forces, also the funding of the oil—rich Gulf states upon
which the PLO had become increasingly dependent.

The loss

of both Russia and Iraq also meant that any idea of someday
defeating Israel in battle was also gone.
84
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The Second Gulf War also precipitated a rise in radical
Islamic movements throughout the region, including the
occupied territories. In the occupied territories the
Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas, seized on the PLO's
misfortunes and expanded its own following and support
while escalating its radical approach with increased
violent attacks against the IDF and Jewish settlers.

The

Intifada itself had become a costly and embarrassing
problem for Israel, only further exacerbated by the growing
dominance of Hamas.
The conjunction of these variables produced a crisis
for both Israel and the PLO.

The Madrid Peace Conference,

convened after the end of the Second Gulf War, put Israel
in a position of having to pursue negotiations with a
united Arab bargaining front.

This front was led by Syria,

now participating in the process as a result of its
participation with the coalition forces against Iraq.
Syrian participation was also motivated by the desire to
establish relations with the West in order to replace the
support it had lost with the demise of the USSR.
Syrian leadership in the negotiations followed the
principle that only a united bargaining position could
wrest the concessions it felt were necessary for a
comprehensive peace, mainly the total withdrawal of Israel
from all of the occupied territories.

This position was

untenable for Israel, who felt such a move would jeopardize
its national security, its primary self-interest in all
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policies that it pursued.

The PLO, now without patronage,

diplomatic support, or funding, found itself in the
position of possibly being left completely out of any
possible peace agreement and not being a party to the
limited self-rule that was to take place in the occupied
territories.

This position was untenable for Arafat, for

such an outcome would mean the eventual demise of the PLO
and its leadership.
The solution to the mutual crisis of Israel and the PLO
was to pursue the secret talks that led to the Declaration
of Principles.

This agreement saved the PLO and Arafat

from oblivion, and enabled Israel to break up the united
Arab bargaining front and pursue negotiations with each
party separately, greatly increasing its bargaining power
and the chances that it would be able to keep the majority
of the occupied territories.

All of these developments fit

with Denfronzo's theoretical framework of revolutionary
conflict.
The untenable positions in which both actors found
themselves produced the frustration that led to
participation in the negotiations, an uprising of sorts
against the established channels of diplomacy and
bargaining that were not producing results for either
party, and in fact jeopardized Israeli security.

Rabin,

Peres, and Arafat participated in a dissident elite
movement away from the official channels, and against the
wishes of significant portions of their respective
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constituencies in order to reach an agreement.

The

unifying motivator for both Israel and the PLO was selfpreservation.

The PLO needed an agreement to reestablish

its lost funding and to prevent its total eclipse from the
occupied territories by Hamas, or in the case of a
negotiated settlement with the Palestinian delegation to
the peace talks, by local Palestinians in the occupied
territories.

Israel preserved its self-interest of

national security by breaking up the united Arab bargaining
front that threatened collective Arab action to take away
significant portions of the territory it had held since
1967.

The agreement would also shift the security problem

of dealing with Hamas to the PLO.
For the PLO, the state crisis was the loss of
patronage and diplomatic support of first the USSR and then
Iraq.

For Israel, it was the possibility of having to give

up territory that it felt was essential to its security in
the face of united Arab bargaining pressure.

The

permissive and tolerant world context was created by the
world—wide optimism that a comprehensive peace agreement
would be achieved in the Middle East following the Second
Gulf War.

Four years of constant media coverage of the

Intifada and the plight of the Palestinian people in the
occupied territories also contributed to the optimism for
an agreement.
Reaction to the peace agreement has, of course, been
mixed.

"Our salvaging the PLO today is like the United
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States propping up the Soviet Union and Communism after
winning the Cold War," said an advisor to Prime Minister
Yitzhak Rabin.176 The Israeli writer Amos Oz said in a BBC
interview shortly after the agreement was announced that,
"this is the second biggest victory in the history of
Zionism."177 Former Secretary of State James Baker, when
asked in an interview as to whether or not the PLO could be
trusted, replied that it was irrelevant since the only
concession Israel had made was to recognize the PLO as the
representative of the Palestinian people.178
Edward W. Said, University Professor at Columbia
University and a leading Palestinian intellectual, wrote in
response to the accords that it showed the need for Israel
to find a Palestinian partner in order to produce a
settlement that it could live with and would improve its
"...public image, which had sunk to very new lows because of
the Intifada...."179 Said also wrote that the PLO "...has the
distinction of being the first national liberation movement
in history to sign an agreement to keep an occupying power
in place."180
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The Israeli calculation is that by accepting the policing of
Gaza— which Begin tried to give to Sadat fifteen years ago
and which in 1992 Rabin and Peres said they wished would
disappear into the sea— the PLO would soon fall afoul of
local competitors, of whom Hamas is only one.181

The end result of this is a much weaker PLO which will be
easier to bargain with in the future when it comes time to
negotiate all of the final status issues.
In its competition with the PLO and its opposition to
any negotiated settlement, Hamas has only to keep up the
violent attacks against the IDF and Jewish settlers.

In

doing so, Hamas might succeed in discrediting both the PLO
and the Labor Alignment government, causing Rabin and Peres
to lose the next election.

The Likud opposition has

already announced that if it comes to power, the first
thing it will do is to suspend the Declaration of
Principles. This would be a victory for Hamas, and it
could reinvigorate its struggle to overthrow Israel.

Imad

al—Falouji, a principal Hamas leader in Gaza said in an
interview that, "Israel does not want Peace.
security, and we hold the key to that.

It wants

And if they want

their security, they have to listen to us.

This is not

peace yet."182 According to historian Richard W. Bulliet,
"secular Muslims, with their foreign cheering sections,

181Said, The Politics of Dispossession, xxxvii.
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New York T i m e s , 25 August 1995, 1(A) and 5(A).
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will be confronting religious Muslims long after an
independent Palestinian state comes into being, and smart
money will not be on the secularists."183
Regardless of the final outcome, the signing of the
Declaration of Principles between Israel and the PLO was a
watershed event in the Arab— Israeli conflict.

Such an

event cannot be studied in isolation, but must take into
account the wider context in which it occurs. Examining
and analyzing the variables and influences that produced an
environment conducive to the peace agreement necessitates
the use of a multi—theoretical approach.

By applying

different theories at different levels of analysis the
whole context can be examined, and in doing so, produce a
better understanding of events such as the peace agreement
between Israel and the PLO.

183Richard W. Bulliet, "The Future of the Islamic Movement,"
Foreign Affairs 72, no. 5 (November— December 1993):
40.
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